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POST-GILMORE -

RECENT TRENDS IN THE

DEDUCTIBILITY OF PROFESSIONAL FEES
by
Lawrence B. Gibbs*
T HAS been suggested that attorneys and accountants, as well as their
clients, have a vested interested in the tax deductibility of professional
fees. This enlightened self-interest, together with the fact that the deduction of professional fees is nowhere specifically mentioned in the Internal
Revenue Code, may help to explain the almost overwhelming number of
cases involving the deductibility of legal and accounting expenses As the
number of recent cases indicates, litigation in this area is not slackening.2
Of the nine Supreme Court decisions which have considered the deduction
of professional fees, four have been handed down in the last seven years.'
Even so, the ground rules in this area are by no means settled, so that generalization or categorization as to deductibility of specific types of fees is
hazardous. There are, however, certain trends which are becoming apparent
to which this Article is addressed.
Traditionally, the taxpayer has attempted to sustain the deduction of
professional fees under one of two sections of the Internal Revenue Code:
either section 162," dealing with business expenses, or section 212," dealing with an individual's so-called nonbusiness expenses. Recently, however,
deduction has been asserted under other Code sections! Conversely, the
Government traditionally has opposed deduction of professional fees in one
of two ways: either by arguing that the fees are nondeductible or that they
should be capitalized.
SB.A., Yale University; LL.B., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Corpus Christi, Texas.
See generally the cases cited and discussed in the following articles: Brodsky & McKibbin,
Deduction of Non-Trade or Non-Business Expenses, 2 TAX L. REV. 39 (1946); Brookes, Litigation
Expenses and the Income Tax, 12 TAX L. REv. 241 (1957); Dohan, Deductibility of Non-Business
Legal and Other Professional Expenses; Expenses for Creation or Protection of Income or Property,
Divorce, etc., N.Y.U. 17TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 579 (1959); Krane, Deducting Legal and Accounting Fees: Selected Problems, 44 TAXES 7 (1966); McDonald, Deduction of Attorneys' Fees
for Federal Income Tax Purposes, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 168 (1954); Schlenker, Tax Deductibility
of Legal Fees, 54 A.B.A.J. 199 (1968); Winokur, Deductibility of Legal and Other Professional

Fees, S.

CAL. 15TH TAX INST.

457 (1963).

By this author's count over eighty cases involving deduction of professional fees have been
decided in the last three years.
'Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966); United States v. Patrick, 372 U.S. 53 (1963);
United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963); United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962);
Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118 (1952); Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365
(1945); Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943); Van Wart v. Commissioner, 295 U.S.
112 4 (1935); Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928).
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162.
5id. § 212.
6E.g., Carl A. Gerstacker, 49 T.C. 522 (1968) (legal fees for guardianship in connection with
commitment to sanitarium not deductible as medical expenses under § 213); Katherine Ander, 47
T.C. 592 (1967) (legal expenses incident to recovery of stolen funds deductible as theft loss under
§ 165(c) (3)); James L. Schmidt, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1218 (1967) (husband's payment of
wife's legal fees at time of divorce not deductible under § 215 as alimony); Richard L. Malter, 26
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 459 (1967) (attorney's fees incurred in unsuccessful venture deductible under
§§ 162, 165 as loss from transaction entered into for profit); Rev. Rul. 401, 1967-2 CUM. BULL.
123; Rev. Rul. 471, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 109 (involving deduction of legal fees as research and
development expenses under § 174 of the Code).
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The nondeductibility approach may take one of several forms. The
Government may assert that the fees are not deductible because they are
either personal expenses,7 expenses relating to the production of tax-exempt
income, s expenses of another taxpayer, 9 or because their allowance would in
some way violate public policy.1" The Commissioner's second line of argument, which usually appears as an alternative to the first, is that the legal
fees are capital in nature within the meaning of section 263," with the result that deduction must be deferred to or over a period of time in the future, if not postponed entirely. It is in this area of nondeductible versus
capital expense that much of the current tax law relating to professional
fees is emerging.
One of the most interesting developments in the professional fees area,
which is possibly indicative of a larger trend in the general income tax
field, involves the relation of the scope of deductibility of fees under section
162 as business expenses to the scope of deductibility of fees as nonbusiness
expenses under section 212. It is well established that these two sections are
related in scope and are to be similarly construed."2 In practice, however,
the scope of deduction of professional fees as business expenses has been
increasing, while the scope of deduction of professional fees as nonbusiness
expenses (with one exception) has been diminishing.
I. THE PRE-GILMORE BACKGROUND

A good indication of this trend may be seen in the Supreme Court decisions involving the deduction of professional fees. Interestingly, the only
case in which the Supreme Court has ever denied the deduction of an attorney's fee as a business expense involved a situation in which the fee was
clearly a nonbusiness expense. In Van Wart v. Commissioner" legal fees
and litigation expenses incurred by a guardian to secure income for his
ward were deducted as business expenses in the ward's income tax return.
The Commissioner disallowed the deduction on the grounds that the fees
were personal expenses of the minor. Since this was before the enactment
of the nonbusiness expense section, deduction was denied, but the case led
to the enactment of the predecessor to what is now section 212 (1) and
(2) allowing deduction of nonbusiness expenses for the production or collection of income or for the management, conservation, or maintenance of
property held for the production of income.1"
"

8

INT. REV. CoDE of 1954, § 262.

1d. § 265.

'E.g., United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 74-75 (1962); Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488
(1940); Picker v. United States, 371 F.2d 486 (Ct. Cl. 1967). Compare Southern Ariz. Bank &
Trust Co. v. United States, 386 F.2d 1002 (Ct. Cl. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 967 (1969),
with Bonnyman v. United States, 57-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9938 (E.D. Tenn. 1957), aff'd, 261 F.2d
835 (6th Cir. 1958).
'°See Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966). See generally Diamond, The Relevance
(or Irrelevance) of Public Policy in Disallowance of Income Tax Deductions, 44 TAxEs 803
(1966); Shaiman, The Public Policy Doctrine After Tellier, 52 A.B.A.J. 1074 (1966).
'1 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, S 263.
"United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 45 (1963); Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325
U.S. 365, 373-74 (1945).
3295 U.S. 112 (1935).
4
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, 5 212(1), (2), formerly S 23(a) (2) of the Int. Rev. Code of
1939, and originally part of the 1942 Internal Revenue Act.
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The most recent Supreme Court decision allowing deduction of professional fees as business expenses is the Tellier case1" which permitted the deduction of legal fees of an unsuccessful defense to a criminal prosecution
arising out of the taxpayer's business as a security dealer. The decision has
been a popular one, not only with the lower courts"' and the general bar,
but also with the Internal Revenue Service, especially insofar as it vindicates its earlier position that claims and attorneys' fees arising from private suits and settlements under section 4 of the Clayton Act were deductible," a position which had engendered a good deal of congressional dissatisfaction. 8
Equally as important as Tellier is the original Supreme Court decision in
this area in the Kornhauser case. 9 In Kornhauser the Supreme Court permitted deduction of attorney and accounting fees incurred by the taxpayer in defending against a suit for an accounting brought by the taxpayer's former partner in which title to certain stock was in dispute. The
Commissioner had argued that the legal expenses were personal in nature,
or in the alternative, that they had been incurred in defense of title to
stock and should be capitalized. In upholding the deduction, the Court
sketched the rudiments of two basic tests, either of which, if met, would
permit deduction. The first, the so-called "origin test," allows deduction if
the claims which caused the taxpayer to seek professional counsel originated
in or proximately resulted from the taxpayer's business. In Kornhauser the
lawsuit which gave rise to the attorney's fees in question had involved a
determination of the amount of business income of the partnership; therefore, the Court held that this test was satisfied. The second test, often referred to as the "consequences test,"2 permits deduction if the consequence
of the claims which caused the taxpayer to incur the professional expense
involved potential damage to business reputation or loss of specific business assets. In this regard, the Court in Kornhauser cited the deductibility
of costs incurred by a doctor in defending against a malpractice suit. The
Court indicated that since the costs of producing business income were
deductible, the costs of conserving it should also be allowed as a deduction. 1
Since the Kornhauser decision, the Supreme Court, as well as the lower
courts, has vacillated between these two tests in considering the deductibility of professional expenses.22 In the business expense area under section
5

Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966).

16See, e.g., Transport Mfg. & Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 374 F.2d 173 (8th Cir. 1967);
Logan Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1966); Central Coat, Apron & Linen
Serv., Inc. v. United States, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9390 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Grossman & Sons, 48
T.C. 15 (1967).
17Rev. Rul. 224, 1964-2 CUM. BULL. 52; Rev. Rul. 330, 1966-2 CUM. BUILL. 44.
"SSee generally Bolland, Income Tax Treatment of Antitrust Damages, 22 TAX L. REV. 47
(1966); joint Report of Section of Antitrust Law and Section of Taxation Recommending Disapproval of Proposed Legislation to Make Antitrust Treble Damage Payments Non-Deductible, 22
TAx LAWYER 243 (1969); Scallen, The Deductibility of Antitrust Treble Damage Payments, 52
MINN. L. REV. 1149 (1968); Note, Present and Proposed Treatment of Antitrust Treble Damage
Payments, 52 IoWA L. REv. 974 (1967).
" Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928).
20 See Brookes, Litigation Expenses and the Income Tax, 12 TAx L. REV. 241, 274-75 (1957);

Comment, Deductibility of Legal Fees: The Exclusivity of Gilmore, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 351 (1965).
2'276 U.S. at 153.

" Compare Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S.

365 (1945),

and Commissioner v.
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162, the courts have been and still are using both the origin test and the
consequences test as the rationale for the allowance of appropriate deductions.23 In the nonbusiness area under section 212, however, the trend has
been to eliminate the consequences test and to deny deduction unless the
origin test could be met.24
II. THE

GILMORE DECISION

The culmination of this trend toward elimination of the consequences
5
test in the nonbusiness deduction area came in the Gilmore"
and Patrick6
decisions by the Supreme Court in 1963 in which the Court denied deduction of the husbands' legal and accounting expenses relating to the defense
and settlement of certain claims made by their wives at the time of divorce.
In Gilmore the husband incurred legal expenses in successfully litigating
his wife's community property claims to the stock of his wholly owned
corporation from which he derived virtually all of his income. If the wife
had been successful, the husband's stock ownership, as well as his livelihood,
would have been jeopardized. In Patrick the legal and accounting expenses
arose in connection with a New Jersey property settlement under which
there were certain exchanges and long-term leases involving the husband's
business properties that were necessary for the continuation of his publishing business.
In both cases, the taxpayers initially argued that because the fees were
incurred in resisting or settling the wife's claims to certain properties, the
expenses were within the statutory framework allowing deduction of expenses for the conservation of property held for the production of income.
The Court rejected this argument and indicated that the statutory phrase,
"conservation of property," encompassed only safeguarding or upkeep expenses. This narrow construction of section 212 is reminiscent of the
Court's restrictive interpretation of nonbusiness expenses in its earlier
McDonald decision" in which the Court refused to permit a judge's campaign costs for re-election as expenses for the production of income and
stated that the nonbusiness expense section of the Code did not enlarge the
range of allowable deductions, but merely enlarged the category of income
with reference to which expenses were deductible.
The Court in Gilmore and Patrick also pointed out that the line of reasoning adopted by both taxpayers would mean that the expense of defending almost any claim would be deductible by a taxpayer. The taxpayers
countered with the argument, based on a very respectable line of authority
involving several circuit court decisions, including a Fifth Circuit decision,
Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943), with United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963),
v. United States, 343 U.S. 118 (1952).
2see, e.g., Anchor Coupling Co. v. United States, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9347
1969); Smith v. United States, 67-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9416 (S.D. Tex. 1967); Mitchell
States, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9275 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
24See an excellent summary of this trend in the nonbusiness expense area in Meyer
man, 45 T.C. 439 (1966).
25United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1966).
20United States v. Patrick, 372 U.S. 53 (1966).
27

McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57 (1944).

and Lykes
(N.D. Ill.
v. United
J. Fleisch-
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that when specific assets are involved and the claims against these assets,
if successful, are so substantial as to threaten the husband's means of livelihood, the fees should be deductible." To this, the Court replied that the
origin of the claims giving rise to the professional fees, rather than the consequences of the claims, is controlling, and held that since the wife's claims
giving rise to the husband's professional fees stemmed from the marital
relationship and not from any profit-seeking activity, the fees were not
deductible. Prior origin test authorities, such as Du Pont" and Lykes," were
relied upon heavily by the Court. Other cases, such as Heininger" and
Bingham's Trust," in which the Court had adopted a consequences test approach, were not discussed.
The actual holding of the Court is the interesting, and often overlooked,
aspect of the Gilmore decision. A casual reading of the decision suggests
that the Court considered the professional expenses to be nondeductible,
personal expenses under section 262, but closer scrutiny indicates that this
was not the gist of the decision. The Court expressly refused to decide
whether the expenses were personal or capital and remanded the case to the
district court for this determination." The district court, upon remand,
held that the expenses were capital,' and the Government did not appeal
the district court's decision. The reason stated by the Government's attorney in recommending that the case not be appealed was that the Government had stipulated originally in the trial court that defense of title to
the stock was involved in the state court divorce action.2
If the origin test in Gilmore is determinative as to whether expenses are
deductible or personal, it is difficult to understand how the stipulation
would affect the situation. In applying the origin test in Gilmore, the Court
had clearly stated that the expenses were nondeductible because of their
personal origin in the marital dispute. Once this causal relationship is established, the fact that the dispute manifested itself in an argument over
title to stock would seem to be irrelevant under the origin test. Stated differently, if in the chain of events under the origin test the personal problems precede the capital questions, then presumably section 262 would take
precedence over section 263.
This was certainly the attitude of the Internal Revenue Service and the
court of claims in the recent Clapp decision.'" There, the husband and wife
entered into a property settlement agreement in connection with their divorce. The wife later remarried, and at her death, husband No. 2 sued husband No. 1, alleging that husband No. 1 had defrauded the wife at the
2" Owens v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1959); Bowers v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d
904 (6th Cir. 1957); Baer v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1952); McMurtry v. United
States, 132 F. Supp. 114 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
"Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940).
'°Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118 (1952).
"Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943).

"Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 (1945).
372 U.S. at 52.
Gilmore v. United States, 65-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
9546 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
"Action on Decision Letter, July 26, 1965, Internal Revenue Service Library, Washington,
D.C. Ironically, as the AOD indicates, the actual facts were that in the state court the wife was
making a claim for reimbursement rather than a claim against the husband's stock.
"Clapp v. United States, 364 F.2d 425 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
"'
4
3
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time of the property settlement, and asserted title to specific properties
owned by husband No. 1. Husband No. 1 finally settled the claim, but
not before running up a legal bill of $300,000. He attempted to deduct
the fees on the theory that they had been incurred in conservation of his
property. The court of claims refused, asserting that the fees were personal
expenses and were ultimately traceable not to the settlement of husband
No. 2's claim, but to the marital difficulties which gave rise to the original
divorce.
Despite the compelling logic of the Clapp case, the Government's attorney may have been correct in his analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in Gilnore. His position, and that of the Court, appears to be that in
order to determine whether an expense is deductible under section 212 one
looks to the origin of the activities giving rise to the expense. If the origin
is not the production of income or the conservation or maintenance of
property held for the production of income, the expense is not deductible
under section 212. In such event, however, one still has to go a step further to determine whether the expense is personal or capital. In making
this second determination the origin test is not applicable, according to the
California district court in its decision on remand. Viewed in this manner,
the holding of the Court in Gilmore is substantially narrowed. Unfortunately, as indicated by the Clapp case, subsequent decisions often have understandably failed to make this subtle distinction."7
III.

POST-GILMORE-NONBUSINESS

EXPENSES

The capital versus personal nature of the expenses incident to divorce is
not the only problem which has been spawned by Gilmore. Possibly more
important is the distinction which has arisen in the treatment of expenses
incurred by the husband and wife in connection with divorce. Prior to
Gilmore, a number of cases had held that the wife's legal expenses at the
time of divorce, insofar as they related to obtaining alimony, were deductible as expenses for the production of income. 8 Less than three months
after the Gilmore decision, the tax court in the Elliott case39 allowed the
wife to deduct attorney's fees incurred in collecting unpaid alimony that
had been awarded under a prior divorce, and a year later the Government
acquiesced in this decision.4"
Despite the acquiescence, the Internal Revenue Service went back for a
second try in the Wild case,4 which involved the deduction of a wife's attorney fees at the time of divorce in connection with alimony negotiations.
In the Wild case the tax court was divided. One judge would have dis" Compare Clapp v. United States, 364 F.2d 425 (Ct. Cl. 1966), with Vermont Bank &
Trust Co. v. United States, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9268 (D. Vt. 1969), and Powell v. United
States, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9221 (S.D.S.D. 1969). In Powell it is indicated that the Gilmore
rationale is not applicable to the question of whether legal expenses must be capitalized.
8
" Estate of Daniel Buckley, 37 T.C. 664 (1962), acquiesced in, 1964-2 CUM. BULL. 4; Charlotte M. Douglas, 33 T.C. 349 (1959); Barbara B. LeMond, 13 T.C. 670 (1949), acquiesced in,
1952-1 CUM. BULL. 3; Elsie B. Gale, 13 T.C. 661 (1949), afftd, 191 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1951),
acquiesced in, 1952-1

CUM. BULL. 2.

39Jane Elliott, 40 T.C. 304 (1963).
401964-1

CUM. BULL. 4.

41Ruth K. Wild, 42 T.C. 706 (1964).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 23

allowed the deduction and distinguished the Elliott case on the grounds
that in Elliott alimony had already been awarded and Mrs. Elliott was
simply trying to collect it, whereas Mrs. Wild's legal fees were incurred at
the time of divorce in acquiring the alimony.' However, a majority of the
tax court upheld the deduction on the grounds that the Gilmore decision
was limited to section 212(2) involving conservation of property held
for the production of income, whereas in Wild the legal fees fell under section 212 (1) since they related to the collection or production of income.
The court's analysis provides an interesting but questionable study in statutory construction. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, for purposes of
convenience only, separates the two provisions into sections 212 (1) and
212 (2). In the 1939 Code, they appear together as section 23 (a) (2) ; they
were passed at the same time, and the legislative history indicates no basis
for distinguishing between the two."3 Finally, in Gilmore, the Court was
construing the 1939, not the 1954, Code.
The Internal Revenue Service, however, has acquiesced in the Wild decision;" so apparently the Service is content to live with the difference in
treatment of the husband's and wife's professional fees at the time of divorce. This, along with the conceptual problems which the Service seems
to be having in prescribing the tax treatment to husband and wife where
appreciated property is transferred in exchange for marital rights at the
time of divorce," indicates that this is an area in which further developments will hopefully be forthcoming.
The Wild decision does not, of course, mean that the wife's legal expenses at the time of divorce are always deductible. For example, legal fees
relating to Texas community property settlements are nondeductible under
section 212 (2), as they are incident to the acquisition of property rather
than income." Several cases also indicate that for the wife's attorney fees
to be deductible, the amounts received by her at the time of divorce must

be taxable income to her in the form of alimony."
From the husband's standpoint, the question now appears to be: Is there
any way he can avail himself of the benefits of section 212 (1)? This much
is clear: the husband cannot obtain a deduction by paying the wife's legal

fees, even though she collected alimony. The Supreme Court resolved this
question in the Davis case" a year before the Gilmore decision. With the
wife's success under section 212 (1), some husbands may attempt to ma42

id. at 712.

41 See

Judge Raum's convincing dissent in the Wild case, id. at 711-12.
CuM. BULL. 3.

44 1967-1

' Compare United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), with Rev. Rul. 221, 1967-2 Cum.
BULL. 63.

" Georgia L. Neill, 42 T.C. 793 (1964). See also Hazel Porter, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 448
(1966), aff'd on other grounds, 388 F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1968); cf. David R. Pulliam, 39 T.C.
883 (1963), aff'd on other grounds, 329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1964).
"'Gerald Wolfson, 47 T.C. 290 (1966); Dale A. Swenson, 43 T.C. 897 (1965); Estate of
Daniel Buckley, 37 T.C. 664 (1962); cf. Thomas Kehoe, 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1162 (1968);
Thomas A. Grabien, 48 T.C. 750 (1967).
" United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962). But see Koster, Legal Expenses: Establishing the
Necessary Connection To Insure Deductibility, 4 TAXATION FOR ACCOUNTANTS 80 (1969) (suggesting deductibility of attorney fees as additional alimony payments); cf. James L. Schmidt, 26
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1218 (1967).

1969]

DEDUCTIBILITY OF PROFESSIONAL FEES

neuver from section 212 (2) to 212 (1) by arguing that their legal expenses were incurred to produce income because if they had failed to contest the alimony claims, they would have had to part with or liquidate
substantial income-producing properties and therefore the income from
these properties. Cases in related areas," as well as the regulations under
section 212,' ° indicate the doubtful success of such a gambit. Even if the
husband is content with capitalizing his fees, problems remain. The actual
facts of the Gilmore case involving the tax effect of a wife's claim for reimbursement at the time of divorce raise the interesting question of the
extent to which the husband will be permitted to capitalize his expenses in
defending against a claim for cash rather than a claim against his properties. If the fees can be capitalized, to which of his properties is the increase
in basis attributable, and how is the increase to be allocated?"'
More interesting still is the tax situation of the wife who incurs attorney's fees in connection with a property settlement under which she receives only cash. The absurdity of increasing the basis of cash above face
is obvious. For this reason, courts in other cases in the capital expense area
have permitted deduction of attorney's fees on the grounds that otherwise
deduction of the expense would be lost forever. 2 Where cash is involved,
many courts have ignored the problem; others have indicated that ultimate
loss of the deduction is unpersuasive."
Another unanswered question raised by Gilmore involves its relationship
to the Supreme Court decision in the Davis case" in which it was held that
the husband's transfer of appreciated property in exchange for the wife's
marital rights entails capital gain to the husband. When these two cases are
considered together, the question arises as to whether the husband's legal
fees can be treated as a sales expense which reduces the amount of his gain.
There is, as yet, no case authority in point. Most of the writers have indicated that the husband's fees should be treated as a selling expense, without
much analysis of the problem."2
While it is reasonable to assume that since the Internal Revenue Service
" See Bliss v. Commissioner, 373 F.2d 936 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Martin v. United States, 66-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. 5 9223 (D.S.C. 1966).
5
Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(m) (1957).
" See generally Bledsoe, The Deduction of Legal Fees Relating to Crimes, Divorce, and Taxes,
18 W. RES. L. REV. 862 (1967).
" See, e.g., Petschek v. United States, 335 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1964); California & Hawaiian
Sugar Ref. Corp. v. Commissioner, 311 F.2d 235 (Ct. Cl. 1962); Margit Bessenyey, 45 T.C. 261
(1965), afl'd on other grounds, 379 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1967). See also Spangler v. Commissioner,
323 F.2d 913, 920 (9th Cir. 1963).
" See, e.g., Helvering v. Stormfeltz, 142 F.2d 982 (8th Cir. 1944); Thomas A. Grabien, 48
T.C. 753 (1967); Daniel S.W. Kelly, 23 T.C. 682 (1955), aff'd, 228 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1956);
The Pennroad Corp., 21 T.C. 1087 (1954), aff'd on other grounds, 228 F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1955).
See generally Brookes, Litigation Expenses and the Income Tax, 12 TAX L. REV. 241, 252-53
(1952).
54
United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
'See Winokur, Deductibility of Legal and Other Professional Fees, S. CAL. 15TH TAx INST.
457, 520 (1963). See generally Lucas v. Commissioner, 388 F.2d 472 (1st Cit. 1967); Commissioner v. Doering, 335 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1964); Commissioner v. Coke, 201 F.2d 742 (5th
Cir. 1953). Compare United States v. Mountain States Mixed Feed Co., 365 F.2d 244 (10th Cit.
1966), with United States v. Morton, 387 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1968), Alphaco, Inc. v. Nelson,
385 F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 1967), and Lanrao v. United States, 68-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9566 (E.D.
Tenn. 1968).
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is in effect treating the transaction as a sale by the husband, his professional
fees should similarly be treated as selling expenses, it is perhaps just as reasonable (and certainly from the husband's viewpoint, closer to what he
thought he was doing) to conclude that the expenses were incurred to acquire the wife's marital rights. If the latter approach is adopted, then the
question becomes whether the husband acquires an intangible asset ("wife's
marital rights"?) in which event deduction may be eliminated entirely,
or whether the wife's marital rights are traceable to certain assets retained
by the husband, in which event the fees would presumably be capitalized
and allocated among the various assets."
In assessing the impact of Gilmore on the dichotomy in the treatment of
business and nonbusiness expenses, it is interesting to note the differences in
the tax treatment of the expenses incident to family squabbles in the form
of corporate proxy fights, shareholder derivative suits, and partial or complete liquidations."7 In these situations many of the expenses are deductible
while the expenses of domestic squabbles at the time of divorce, as indicated above, normally are nondeductible, or capitalizable. Thus, Gilnore
teaches that if the husband is defending his stock investments from the
claims of his wife during their divorce, at best the fees will have to be
capitalized, and at worst they may be nondeductible. On the other hand,
several cases indicate that if the person making the claim was an uncooperative or dissident shareholder, the expenses would be deductible in full."s
Pursuing this further, the distinction in tax treatment of expenses arising
in typical business settings under section 162 and those arising in nonbusiness or investment situations under section 212 is brought into sharp
focus by a comparison of the Kornhauser case with the Gilnore case. The
factual similarity of these two cases is striking. Both involved the breakup of partnerships; both involved title to stock; in both the Government
initially asserted that the expenses were personal in nature, or in the alternative, that they were capital items. If there is a distinction, presumably it
would be that the dissolution of the partnership in Kornhauser arose in a
business context while the divorce in Gilmore arose out of the personal
marital difficulties of the spouses."5 As a practical matter, however, causes
" See Illinois Nat'l Bank v. United States, 273 F.2d 231

(7th Cir. 1959); O'Malley v. Yost,

186 F.2d 603 (8th Cir. 1951). But see Jacob Gasman, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 213 (1967).
" See generally cases and authorities cited in B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION

OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 54,

61

(2d ed.

1966).

" Compare Five Star Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 355 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1966), Graham v.
Commissioner, 326 F.2d 878 (4th Cir. 1964), Surasky v. United States, 325 F.2d 191 (5th Cir.
1953), Locke Mfg. Cos. v. United States, 65-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9115 (D. Conn. 1964), Sergievsky
v. McNamara, 55-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9702 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), and Central Foundry Co., 49 T.C.
234 (1967), with Larchfield Corporation v. United States, 373 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1966), William
Scheefer, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 474 (1966), and Rev. Rul. 1, 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 28. Compare
Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Commissioner, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9336 (7th Cir. 1969), Vermont Bank
& Trust Co. v. United States, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9268 (D. Vt. 1969), and Stempfel v. United
States, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9238 (M.D. Tenn. 1969), with Smith Hotel Enterprises, Inc. v.
Nelson, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9379 (8th Cir. 1969), and Fred W. Woodward, 49 T.C. 377 (1968).
Compare Hochschild v. Commissioner, 161 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1947), and Mitchell v. United
States, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9275 (Ct. Cl. 1969), with Galewitz v. Commissioner, 69-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. 5 9442 (2d Cir. 1969), Munson v. McGinnes, 283 F.2d 333 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
880 (1960), and Rees Blow Pipe Mfg. Co., 41 T.C. 598 (1964), aff'd per curiam, 342 F.2d 990
(9th Cir. 1965).
" See United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 53 n.22 (1962).
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and origins of partnership dissolution, business or marital, are rarely definable in terms solely business or solely personal. The Buder case ' underscores this. In that case, the taxpayer was attempting to deduct the costs
incurred in defending against a partnership accounting suit brought by his
brother. The taxpayer relied upon Kornhauser; the Government upon Gilmore. The court found that personal, as well as business, matters prompted
the original accounting suit, and although it admitted that allocation of the
fees between business and personal items was difficult and possibly arbitrary, allocation was nevertheless made.
IV.

POST-GILMORE-BUSINESS

EXPENSES

The Buder case also illustrates another important ramification of the
Gilmore decision: its effect on cases involving deductibility of professional
fees as business expenses under section 162. What has happened is that the
taxpayer, the courts, and the Commissioner have all imported the origin
test to sustain or deny deductibility of expenses arising in business settings.
For example, it has been fairly well accepted that expenses attributable to
recovery for personal injuries are nondeductible, if for no other reason
than because these expenses are attributable to the production of taxexempt income."' Nevertheless, an attorney recently borrowed the proximate cause test from Gilmore in an attempt to sustain the deductibility of
legal fees attributable to recoveries for personal injuries received by a taxpayer in an automobile accident while employed as a traveling salesman.
The argument was that these were business expenses in that, "but for" the
taxpayer being on the road at the time of the accident in performance of
his services as an employee-salesman, the injuries would not have been received. The tax court, however, rejected this approach and held that the
expenses were personal."'
One of the most significant cases in this regard is the Second Circuit's decision in the recent Nadiak case,"' in which an airline pilot was denied deduction of legal expenses incurred by him in defending against claims of assault and battery and grand larceny asserted by his former wife, despite
the fact that the wife's claims were admittedly spurious and even though
conviction would have resulted in loss of his commercial pilot's license. The
court again emphasized the personal origin of the wife's claims rather than
the business consequences of the claims to the husband. In contrast, a number of earlier tax court decisions had upheld the deductibility of legal expenses where the taxpayer's livelihood and income-producing capacity were
0

°Buder v. United States, 63-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 5 9661 (E.D. Mo. 1963).
"54A J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 25.128 (1966).
62Joseph D. Murphey, 48 T.C. 569 (1967). See also Finger v. United States, 66-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. 5 9490 (D.S.C. 1966); Estate of David B. Trott, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 74 (1969); Milton
Margoles, 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 319 (1968); J. C. McCaa, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 711 (1967);
Charles A. Weil, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 388 (1967); Maxwell R. Lenington, 25 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1350 (1966); Paul Caspers, 44 T.C. 411 (1965). See also Dyer v. Commissioner, 352 F.2d
948 (8th Cir. 1965); Merritt M. Meredith, 47 T.C. 441 (1967); cf. Russell v. Riddell, 66-2
U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9536 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
"aNadiak v. Commissioner, 356 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1966); cf. Mitchell v. United States, 69-1
U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9275 (Ct. Cl. 1969). See also Dick v. Commissioner, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9335
(2d Cir. 1969).
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in jeopardy because of the potential effect of legal proceedings instituted
against him, even though the activities which gave rise to the suit had their
origin in the personal affairs of the taxpayer."
The length to which the courts have stretched the origin test in the
business expense area is illustrated by the Serino decision." In this case a
mother was denied deduction of legal expenses incurred to protect her
separate business interests from the claims of her son's creditors, who were
asserting that she was a partner in her son's business. The court merely
cited the family relationship between the mother and son, which apparently gave rise to the creditors' allegations, and failed to consider the legitimate business reasons which prompted the mother to seek legal advice to
avoid the creditors' baseless claims.
The significance of the Gilmore decision in the business expense area is,
perhaps, best illustrated by a comparison of the tax court and Fourth Circuit opinions in the Harry L. Peckham case, 6 in which the taxpayer, a licensed physician, had incurred legal fees in unsuccessfully defending against
a prosecution for the performance of an illegal abortion. The tax court reluctantly disallowed deduction on the grounds of public policy. The circuit court affirmed but, possibly with an eye on the pending Tellier case,
did so on the grounds that the taxpayer had failed to introduce evidence
establishing that the abortion was proximately related to the practice of
medicine.6 In relying upon the business origin rationale, the Fourth Circuit in Peckham accurately forecast the importance of the Gilnore decision in the criminal area which, as indicated by the Tellier decision, can be
summarized by saying that proximate cause has replaced public policy.
Thus, in a recent Fifth Circuit decision, the court pointed to the personal
activities of the taxpayer which gave rise to criminal deportation proceedings against him as a basis for denying deduction of his attorney's fees in
unsuccessfully contesting the criminal charges."
It is clear that if one is to avail himself of the benefits of Tellier, he must
be prepared to show the business or profit-seeking origin of the activities
giving rise to the criminal prosecution. This is also the thrust of a recently
issued Revenue Service ruling involving legal expenses incurred in the unsuccessful defense of civil or criminal tax evasion charges.'
64Paul Draper, 26 T.C. 201 (1956), acquiesced in, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 5; Waldo Salt, 18 T.C.
182 (1952); Lindsay Howard, 16 T.C. 157 (1951).
e Serino v. United States, 66-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9471 (D.S.C. 1966); ci. Beerman v. United
States, 390 F.2d 638 (6th Cir. 1968); Parker v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 792 (8th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1026 (1967); Smith v. United States, 67-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9416 (S.D.
Tex. 1967).
6
Henry L. Peckham, 40 T.C. 315 (1963), aff'd, 327 F.2d 855 (4th Cir. 1964).
6 40 T.C. at 318.
68327 F.2d at 857.
(5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1044
69Marcello v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 499
(1968). See also Glimco v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1968); Mitchell v. United
States, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9275 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Charles A. Weil, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 388
(1967); J.J. Matles, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1489 (1964). Compare Raymond Biggs, 27 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 1177, 1206 (1968), and Paul Caspers, 44 T.C. 411 (1965), with Estate of David
B. Trott, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 74 (1969), and Milton Margoles, 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 319
(1968). See generally De Castro, Tellier Upsets IRS Rule On Legal Fees; Sets Up New Criteria For
Business Deductions, 25 J. TAXATION 70 (1966).
70Rev. Rul. 662, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 69. See also Raymond Biggs, 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
1177, 1206 (1968); 20 ABA TAX SECTIoN No. 1, at 200 (1966). For pre-Tellier cases in this
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V. POST-GILMORE-TAX ADVICE EXPENSES71

In spite of the increasing reliance on the Gilmore decision in the business and nonbusiness deduction cases, there is one area in which its rationale has thus far been rejected by the courts: cases involving deduction of
professional expenses for tax advice under section 212 (3) of the Code.
There has as yet been relatively little attention paid by the courts and the
commentators to section 212 (3), and the attitude of the Internal Revenue
Service, together with the comments made in several recent articles, have
caused a good deal of concern and confusion among tax practitioners and
the general bar as to the scope of deduction of legal fees for tax advice. 2
The permissible area of deduction of tax advice expenses has been
plagued with uncertainty for many years. Prior to the adoption of the
1954 Code, a considerable amount of tax litigation involved the deductibility of expenses for tax counsel in a variety of situations." The principal
problem in these early cases involved the relationship of the tax expense to
the production or collection of income or to the conservation, maintenance
or management of property. Some relief was afforded by an amendment
to the regulations in 1946,"' but many problems remained and litigation
continued. Even with the adoption of section 212 (3) in 1954, the current
status of the deductibility of expenses for tax advice is still unsatisfactory.
The Internal Revenue Service previously has taken the position that in addition to deduction of expenses incurred in a tax controversy, the only permissible deduction under section 212 (3) is for expenses directly related to
the preparation of tax returns." Apparently, the position of the Internal
Revenue Service is that expenses for tax advice not related to the computation or contest of tax liability for completed tax years are not deductible."'
The courts, however, have rejected the Service's position and have upheld
deduction of expenses for tax advice not specifically involving tax litigaregard, see, e.g., Bell v. Commissioner, 320 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1963); Commissioner v. Shapiro,
278 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1960); Tracy v. United States, 284 F.2d 379 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Port v.
United States, 58-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9702 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
71 Portions of this section have been adapted from a memorandum prepared by the author as
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Deductibility of Legal Fees, General Income Tax Committee,
Taxation Section of American Bar Association and presented to Internal Revenue Service. See 20
ABA TAx SECTION No. 4, at 78-79 (1967); 19 ABA TAX SECTION No. 4, at 86 (1966); 21
THE TAX LAWYER 708

(1968).

" Compare the Government's statement of position in Kaufmann v. United States, 64-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. 5 9235 (W.D. Mo. 1963), and Carpenter v. United States, 338 F.2d 366, 369 (Ct. Cl. 1964),
and the statement of position by the Tax Court in George L. Schultz, 50 T.C. 688 (1968), with
7 CCH 1966 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 5 8597, at 73,991; De Castro, Recent Cases Show Liberal
Trend in Allowing Deductions For Legal Fees, 23 J. TAXATION 224 (1965); Kabaker, Deductibility
of Estate Planning Fees, 54 ILL. B.J. 726 (1966); Scott, Deductions For Cost of Tax Advice Are
Often Subject to IRS Attack, 22 J. TAXATION 172 (1965).
" See Brodsky & McKibbin, Deduction of Non-Trade or Non-Business Expenses, 2 TAX L.
REv. 39, 58-64 (1946).
74 1946 1-2 CUM. BULL. 61.
' Apparently, however, the Internal Revenue Service does not restrict deductible expenses for
tax return preparation to the actual cost of preparation. See Rev. Rul. 180, 1958-1 CuM. BULL.
153, allowing deduction for appraisal fees incurred to establish the amount of a casualty loss
deduction claimed by the taxpayer, and Rev. Rul. 461, 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 125, allowing deduction of appraisal fees necessary to establish amount of charitable deduction attributable to gift of
property to charity. See also Valuation of Donated Property, IRS PUBLICATION No. 561, at 7
(1968).
76 See Kaufmann v. United States, 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9235 (W.D. Mo. 1963); Carpenter v.
United States, 338 F.2d 366, 369 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
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tion or preparation of tax returns,"' but the courts have not been in complete agreement as to the scope of the deduction permitted by section
212 (3)."7
Several recent cases and rulings suggest, however, the possibility that the
Internal Revenue Service is reconsidering its position in this area."9 In order
to better understand the basis for the position of the Internal Revenue
Service in this area, as well as its possible shift in position, it is necessary
to review the tax background of professional fees for tax advice.
Prior to 1945, in reliance upon issued regulations, the Internal Revenue
Service had taken the position that expenses for preparing tax returns, resisting proposed deficiencies, or recovering taxes were not deductible management expenses under the nonbusiness expense section of the 1939 Code.8 °
The Supreme Court, however, in the Bingham's Trust case"' held that these
provisions of the regulations were unduly restrictive and inconsistent with
the provisions of the statute. Following this decision, the regulations under
this section were amended to provide, in part, that "expenses paid or incurred by an individual in the determination of liability for taxes upon his
income are deductible."" Although the 1946 amendment to the regulations allowed deduction for expenses attributable to income tax liability,
the amendment expressly denied the deduction of such expenses in situations involving gift tax liability. The validity of the regulations in this respect was upheld by the Supreme Court in Lykes v. United States."
The decision of the Supreme Court in the Lykes case was nullified two
years later by the adoption of section 212 (3) which specifically allows the
deduction of nonbusiness expenses paid "in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax."" The House and Senate committee reports" of section 212 (3) have occasioned discussion of the intent of
the legislature in adopting this section. When the committee reports are
read in the context of the administrative and case law which preceded
them, it may be fairly said that although section 212 (3) is clearly intended
to overturn the result reached by the Supreme Court in the Lykes case, it
is not clear that the legislature intended to restrict this section's applicability to expenses attributable to tax litigation and the preparation of tax returns. The only suggestion that such an interpretation was intended appears in a statement made by Thomas N. Tarleau, " then Chairman of the
7

1 See Kaufmann v. United States, 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9235
(W.D. Mo. 1963); Carpenter
v. United States, 338 F.2d 366 (Ct. Cl. 1964); Davis v. United States, 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. CI.
1961).
71Comsare Carpenter v. United States, 338 F.2d 366 (Ct. CI. 1964), and Davis v. United
States, 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. CI. 1961), with Kaufmann v. United States, 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9235 (W.D. Mo. 1963), and Leslie Q. Coupe, 52 T.C. 45 (1969).
71 Palmquist v. United States, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9230 (N.D. Cal. 1967); Lyta J. Morris,
25 CCH Tax Ct. Men,. 1248 (1966); Carlos Marcello, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1847, 1861 (1964).
Compare Rev. Rul. 411, 1967-2 Cum. BULL. 124, with Rev. Rul. 125, 1967-1 CUM. BULL. 31.
8
"Treas. Reg. 111, S 29.23(a)-15 (1942).
"'Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 (1945).
82 1946 1-2 Cum. BULL. 61.
S343 U.S. 118 (1952).
84
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 212(3).
85H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A59 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d

Sess. 34 (1954).
88 Hearings on H.R. 8300 before Senate Finance Committee, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 487 (1954).
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Taxation Section of the American Bar Association, in commenting upon
the language of the House Ways and Means Committee report before the
Senate Finance Committee. The later report of the Senate Finance Committee does not discuss Mr. Tarleau's comments but reiterates the statutory
language of section 212 (3) .
The final regulations adopted under section 212 (3) suggest that the
Treasury shares the view that the scope of the new section is not limited to
the expenses of tax contests and tax return preparation. The regulations
originally proposed under this section provided:
Expenses paid or incurred by an individual in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax, whether the taxing authority be federal,
state or municipal, and whether the tax be income, estate, gift, property, or
any other tax, are deductible. Thus, expenses incurred in connection with the
preparation of tax returns or in connection with any proceedings involved in
determining the extent of tax liability or in contesting a tax liability are
deductible."
When the final regulations were issued, however, the second sentence of
these proposed regulations was amended to provide: "Thus, expenses paid
or incurred by a taxpayer for tax counsel or expenses paid or incurred in
connection with the preparation of his tax returns or in connection with
any proceedings involved in determining the extent of his tax liability or
in contesting his tax liability are deductible."89
The first case to consider specifically the deductibility of expenses under
section 212 (3) for tax counsel neither connected with litigation nor with
the preparation of a tax return was Davis v. United States" in which the
taxpayer-husband had deducted the fees paid to his wife's attorney for
income and gift tax advice incident to the property settlement upon their
divorce. The court denied the husband a deduction for the payments to
the wife's attorney but upheld the deductibility of the husband's own legal
expenses. As a basis for the latter holding, the court said:
We have no doubt that Congress in enacting Section 212, supra, meant to
grant a deduction for legal fees in connection with a determination, collection, or refund of any tax. The question then is whether the fees paid by the
plaintiff come within the purview of the Act. In the light of the Treasury
Regulations promulgated thereunder, we think the question can only be
answered in the affirmative. The Regulation, Section 1.212-1, quoted above,
specifically provides that expenses paid or incurred for tax counsel '. . . in
connection with any proceedings involved in determining the extent of tax
liability . ..are deductible.' Therefore it seems clear that the statute and
regulations are broad enough to cover the deduction asked for."
In a later case, Carpenter v. United States,2 the deductibility of legal
87S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 34

(1954).
Treas. Reg. S 1.212-1(1), 22 Fed. Reg. 10052 (1957).
89 Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1 (1) (1957)
(emphasis added).
9Q287 F.2d 168 (Ct. C1..1961).

"8 Prop.

91Id. at 170.
02338 F.2d 366 (Ct. C1. 1964).
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fees for advice concerning tax consequences of the taxpayer's divorce was
upheld and the Government's contention that deductions under section
212 (3) should be limited to expenses attributable to tax controversies was
rejected. After a thorough analysis of the legislative, administrative and
case history of the section, the court stated: "To restrict the deductibility
of expense for tax counsel to the computation or contest of a tax liability
for completed tax years under the particular facts in this case would
defeat the
clear purpose of Section 212 (3) and the regulations Section
1.212-1. "93
The holding in the Carpenter case is significant in that it recognizes the
deductibility of fees for tax advice in the nature of prospective tax planning. The legal fees of the taxpayer in the Davis case had been attributable
primarily to advice concerning his tax liability for the year in which the
divorce settlement was concluded; however, the Carpentercase involved not
only the husband's tax liability for the year of the divorce, but also the
tax treatment of alimony payments made under the divorce decree in future years.

Not all courts, however, have agreed on the scope of deductibility under
section 212 (3) of legal fees for advice concerning the future tax consequences of present transactions. In Kaufmann v. United States" it was held
that the expenses of securing a tax ruling from the Internal Revenue Service on the effect of a corporate reorganization were deductible, but that
the expenses of tax advice concerning the basis of stock received in the reorganization were not deductible. The court indicated that the basis of
the new stock was not ascertained for any current purpose but for some
future use, and that this expense was not incurred "for the purpose of determining any tax."95
The Supreme Court has not specifically considered the scope of the deduction allowed by section 212 (3). In the Davis case, discussed earlier in
this Article, the Court affirmed the decision of the court of claims disallowing the husband's deduction for fees paid to the wife's attorney on the
ground that the payment had not been shown to be "in connection with the
determination, collection or refund" of any tax of the taxpayer. However,
the Government failed to appeal the decision of the court of claims allowing a deduction for the fees paid by the husband to his attorney for tax
advice, and the Court specifically stated that it intimated no opinion on
the deductibility of the husband's fees."
In the Gilmore case, the Court stated that "expenses of contesting tax
liabilities are now deductible under section 212(3) of the 1954 Code."9"
Taken out of context, this might be cited as authority for the proposition
that the deduction under section 212 (3) is limited to expenses in connec3

id. at 370.
" 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas.

0

9

9235 (W.D. Mo. 1963).

31d. at 91,558.

" United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 74 (1962).
" United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 48 n.16 (1962): "Expenses of contesting tax liabilities
are now deductible under S 212(3) of the 1954 Code. This provision merely represents a policy
judgment as to a particular class of expenditures otherwise non-deductible, like extraordinary
medical expenses, and does not cast any doubt on the basic tax structures set up by Congress."
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tion with tax litigation; however, when taken in context, it is clear that
the Court was distinguishing between the legal expense of tax litigation,
which is deductible, and the legal expense of litigation in connection with
divorce and property settlement proceedings, which the Court held to be
nondeductible."s
The legislative and administrative history of section 212 (3) discloses a
continuous expansion in the scope of the Code section pertaining to the
deductibility of nonbusiness expenses for tax counsel. As the cases discussed
above indicate, the courts have also construed the provisions of section
212 (3) broadly to allow deduction of expenses for tax counsel in situations
not involving litigation or tax return preparation."' In view of the history
of expansion of the scope of this deduction, the Internal Revenue Service's
position that the deduction should be limited to expenses for tax litigation
or tax return preparation appears anomalous. For, if adopted, the position
of the Internal Revenue Service could have the incongruous result that the
deduction of such expenses would be more limited under the 1954 Code
than under the 1939 Code. Under the 1939 Code, if tax advice was secured in conjunction with financial advice for the purpose of conserving
or maintaining the taxpayer's property, the expense was deductible, even
though the advice involved prospective transactions."e If the Internal Revenue Service's interpretation of section 212(3) were upheld, and if the
specific provision of section 212 (3) with regard to the deductibility of tax
advice were considered to control the general provisions of sections 212 (1)
and (2), the part of the expenses in the above cases attributable to tax
advice would become nondeductible under the 1954 Code, even though
they had been considered deductible under the 1939 Code."'
The case history in this area suggests additional problems in the Internal
Revenue Service's position with respect to the deductibility of expenses for
tax counsel. First, these cases illustrate various situations in which tax counsel is given in conjunction with investment advice or advice concerning
the production of income or management of property. Often, the nature
of these services unavoidably combines tax, investment and property management advice in such a manner that it is difficult to precisely define the
98 Id. The Supreme Court's language also suggests that the personal and capital Internal Revenue
Code sections are not applicable to § 212(3). In this regard, query whether there are supportable
distinctions among litigation expenses relating to the taxability of transfers at divorce, expenses in
connection with the preparation of the tax returns of the spouses in the years of divorce, and
professional fees for tax advice to the spouses at the time of divorce. Similarly, is there any basis
for allowing a deduction for litigation expenses concerning the tax consequences of forming a
corporation or partnership but requiring tax expenses incident to the actual formation to be capitalized? But see Leslie Q. Coupe, 52 T.C. 45 (1969).
99 In addition to the Davis, Kaufmann, and Carpenter cases, see also Dooley v. Commissioner,
332 F.2d 463, 468 (7th Cir. 1964) (dicta).
00
1 See Nancy R. Bagley, 8 T.C. 130 (1947), acquiesced in, 1947-1 CUM. BULL. 1 (attorney's
fees for tax and financial advice in estate planning held deductible); Philip D. Armour, 6 T.C.
359 (1946), acquiesced in, 1946-1 CuM. BULL. 1 (legal fees for general tax advice and planning
held deductible); Herman W. Fletcher, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 793 (1951) (attorney's fees for
tax and investment advice concerning trust and estate taxation held deductible); Andrew Jergens,
2 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 385 (1943) (attorney's fees for advice on minimizing individual's taxes
in connection with corporate merger held deductible).
101This is, in part, the thrust of Mr. Tarleau's comments to the Senate Finance Committee in
the hearings on § 212 (3). See note 86 supra.
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portion of the expenses attributable to particular types of advice."' Insofar
as the position of the Internal Revenue Service would require the taxpayer
in the above situations to distinguish the portion of the expense attributable to tax counsel from that attributable to investment or property management advice, the position appears to inevitably involve administrative
difficulties in enforcement due to the inherent difficulty of segregating expenses in the above, and in similar, situations. Furthermore, it is difficult
to justify a distinction which allows deduction of expenses for "investment
counsel" of a prospective nature, but which limits deduction of expenses
for "tax counsel" to the computation or contest of tax liabilities for completed tax years.0 3 Finally, to the extent that deduction for tax counsel encourages tax planning to avoid litigation, the Internal Revenue Service, as
well as the taxpayer, is benefited; for, as the court in the Carpenter case
appropriately observed, "one of the purposes of a taxpayer in obtaining
tax counsel is to avoid tax contests, not to create them, and this also serves
the interest of the Government in collecting taxes. '
Several years ago the Taxation Section of the American Bar Association
formed a subcommittee on deductibility of legal fees to meet with Internal
Revenue Service personnel to discuss policy matters in the section 212 (3)
area. Reports on this project indicate that discussions with the Internal
Revenue Service have thus far produced no policy statements or decisions,
but developments along these lines may be forthcoming in the not too distant future.' Despite this, problems remain, the most important being the
extent to which expenses of tax advice relating to estate planning will be
considered deductible under this section. Traditionally, the expenses of the
actual preparation of wills and trusts have been considered nondeductible."
On the other hand, several cases decided under the 1939 Code have permitted deduction for tax advice relating to estate planning under certain
circumstances. 7 As yet, there has been no decision under section 212 (3)
involving the deduction of estate planning fees.' In any event, it may be
anticipated that deductibility of expenses for tax advice in the state planning area will be a sensitive issue from the standpoint of the Internal Revenue Service.' 0 '
5
"' See, e.g., Michael J. Ippolito, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 894 (1965), in which the court allows deduction of expenses attributable to tax and investment advice under section 212 of the
Code without discussing which part of the section the court is relying upon in reaching its decision.
'' Coinmpare Treas. Reg. § 1.212(g) (1969), with id. § 1.212(e) (1969). See note 98 supra. See
also De Santis, Tax Advice-A Deductible Expense, 10 VILL. L. REv. 357, 362 (1965).
'04 338 F.2d at 369.
10s See note 71 supra.
'O0 Estate of Helen S. Penell, 4 B.T.A. 1039 (1969). See generally Kabaker, Deductibility of
Estate Planning Fees, 54 ILL. B.J. 726 (1966); Marmer, Professional Fees: When Are They Deductible for Estate Planning Work?, 27 J. TAXATION 300 (1967); Winokur, Deductibility of
Legal and Other Professional Fees, S. CAL. 15sH TAX INST. 457, 527-31 (1963).
.. See cases cited in note 100 supra.
's'Cf. George L. Schultz, 50 T.C. 688, 699-700 (1968); Arthur D. McDonald, 52 T.C. 82
(1969).
1°9in 1965 Congressman Wilbur Mills introduced legislation sponsored by the ABA Tax Section which would have amended § 212 to permit deduction of ordinary and necessary expenses:
"(4) in connection with planning, arranging for, or making, by will, revocable or irrevocable
trust, or otherwise a donative or testamentary disposition of property or any interest therein, including proceeds of insurance, by such individual, whether or not such disposition becomes effective." H.R. REP. No. 11450, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1965).
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DEDUCTIBILITY OF PROFESSIONAL FEES
VI. CONCLUSION

Although certain issues involving deductibility of professional fees have
been clarified by recent administrative and judicial pronouncements, the
area generally continues to be confused, many of the case authorities are
inconsistent, and there are very few guideposts that can be relied upon
with assurance.
The principal problem in this area, as indicated (although not articulated) by the myriad of cases involving deduction of professional fees, is
the task of delineating the boundaries of the broad Internal Revenue Code
sections involved in determining whether an expense is personal, capital, or
otherwise deductible. In most of the cases in this area, title to property is
involved in some manner, but this does not mean that all such expenses are
to be capitalized. Often, personal and business matters are intertwined, but
this does not mean that all of the expenses involved should be either nondeductible, personal expenses or deductible, business expenses. Certainly,
property is conserved to the extent that an asserted liability which would
require sale or liquidation of the property is defended, but it does not follow that the cost of defense is always deductible.
It is to the problem of distinguishing the deductible from the nondeductible professional expense in the above situations that the "proximate
cause-origin" test of Gilmore is directed. This decision represents an admirable attempt to formulate a test which will be generally applicable to the
numerous factual situations that arise in this area, and at the same time be
limited enough in application to provide reasonable and predictable results.
Unfortunately, as is often the case with the "but for" approach, the
Gilmore test has proved to be too broad and, in many instances, has become a source of further confusion. For this reason, the courts continue to
use the "primary purpose" test and the "consequences" test in order to rationalize desired results which are not otherwise attainable under a Gilmore
approach.11
In many ways, the problems in the professional fees area reflect those involved in the general business expense area under section 162 in determining when expenses are "ordinary" and "necessary." An analysis of the professional expense cases leads one to suspect that the approach of Justice
Cardozo to the deduction of general business expenses may inevitably be
applicable to the deductibility of professional fees. In the celebrated Welch
case, after reviewing the authorities for determining when business expenses
were "ordinary" and "necessary," Justice Cardozo concluded as follows:
Here indeed, as so often in other branches of the law, the decisive distinctions are those of degree and not of kind. One struggles in vain for any
verbal formula that will supply a ready touchstone. The standard set up by
the statute is not a rule of law; it is rather a way of life. Life in all its fullness
must supply the answer to the riddle."
"'See, e.g., Judge Tannenwald's dissent in support of the "origin" test, rather than the "primary purpose" test, in the capital expense cases in Herman A. Moore Trust, 49 T.C. 430 (1968).
See also the post-Gilmore cases cited in note 23 supra indicating continued reliance on the "consequences" test.
.. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111,

114-15 (1933).

